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This study attempted to determine whether children will relinquish their 
belief in Piagetian concepts upon prescntntion of dixonfirming evidence. 
Two age groups were tested: third- and fourth-grade, and sixth-grade. 
Conservation of weight and tl,ansitirity of weight were the concepts ex- 
amined; the discrepant, feedback consisted of three trials with either non- 
conservation or nontransitit-ity outcomrs. Resistance or extinction was 
inferred from the subject’s csplanniions for the outcomes, his responses on 
subsequent trials, and his performance on a one-month delayed posttest. 
Conservation subjects showc,d only modrrate resistance by any of these 
measures; furthermore, there was no eridence of a developmental increase 
in resistance. Transitivity subjects. in contrast, were much less likely than 
conscrvcrs to change their judgments on either the initial or the delayed 
icat; they also showed the espectrd developmental increase in resistance to 
extinction. The rrsults are interpreted as indicating that Piagetian concepts 
ma>- vary in the extent to which they entail feelings of logical necessity. 
In assessing concepts of conservation, Piaget and his coworkers have 
long used a technique of counter-suggestion (e.g., “But another little boy 
told me . . .” ). Their feeling is that a child who truly understands con- 
servation will be able to resist such contradictory suggestions. As an ex- 
tension of this approach, Smedslund (1961) devised an extinction pro- 
cedure for conservation of weight: A surreptitious removal of material 
during the transformation resulted in unequal weights and apparent non- 
conservation. In this technique, therefore, the child was confronted not 
only with a counter-suggestion but with counter-evidence. Smedslund 
found that children who had been trained to conserve were unable to 
resist extinction, suggesting that the obtained conservation had not been 
genuine. He concluded that the extinction procedure had served its diag- 
nostic function. 
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A second finding of the study, however, complicates this conclusion. Of 
a control group of 13 natural conservers, only six were able to resist 
extinction. Subsequent studies of extinction in natural conservers have 
confirmed this low percentage, both for conservation of weight (Hall & 
Kingsley, 1968; Hall & Simpson, 1968; Kingsley & Hall, 1967; Smith, 
1968) and for conservation of liquid quantity (Brison, 1966; Sullivan, 
1967). Most, in fact, have found even less evidence of resistance than 
that reported by Smedslund (see Miller, 1971, for a review of these 
studies). Such a result necessarily shifts the focus of such research from 
a concern with diagnosis to a concern with the nature of the conservation 
concept itself. For how can this ready abandonment of conservation bc 
reconciled with the Piagetian claim that concepts of conservation are 
experienced as logically necessary (e.g., Piaget, 1971) ? 
One possible answer is to suggest that the extinction in these st’udies 
was apparent rather than real. There is almost certainly some truth to 
this suggestion. All of the studies have relied heavily on the child’s im- 
mediate verbal response in inferring resistance or extinction (thus, e.g., 
“You took some clay away” would be a resistance response). Two (Hall 
& Simpson, 1968; and Smith, 1968) have also examined judgments on 
subsequent conservation trials. In either case, to be credited with re- 
sistance a child has had to contradict what the experimenter has just 
demonstrated as true. Given the social pressure of the situation, some 
percentage of misdiagnosis seems assured. 
Miller (1973) attempted to increase the probability that a continuing 
belief in conservation, if present, could be identified. Conservation of 
weight was the concept, with the discrepant feedback provided by means 
of a rigged balance. Each of the three feedback trials was followed by 
extensive probing concerning what had happened; in addition, there was 
a series of posttest trials without feedback, as well as further questioning 
at the end of the session. Surprise was measured as well as cognitive 
change. As expected, these procedures yielded more evidence of resistance 
than had been found in most previous studies. In particular, slightly 
more than half of the subjects were able to provide at least one resistance 
explanation (i.e., an explanation which denied the validity of the non- 
conservation outcome). On the other hand, there were still many chil- 
dren who appeared to abandon their belief in conservati’on upon pres- 
entation of one or two discrepant outcomes. In addition, measurable 
surprise was extremely rare. 
The present study is an extension of Miller (1973). The central concern 
remains the problem of logical necessity-do feelings of necessity accom- 
pany an understanding of Piagetian concepts, and if so can their presence 
be inferred from the child’s reactions when those concepts are violated? 
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Three extensions of the previous study are included. The most important 
extension is the inclusion of an additional concept. As noted, extinction 
studies have focused on conservation, especially conservation of weight. 
The present study stays within the domain of weight but includes a 
separate condition for transitivity. In Piaget’s theory, both conservation 
and transitivity are based in logical structures, and the same necessity 
is claimed for both. Any concept, however, no matter how logical at base, 
requires some grounding in physical experience and physical knowledge 
as well. It can be argued that the role of physical experience is in general 
greater for conservation than it is for transitivity. For conservation, the 
child must learn to cope with the effects of numerous different trans- 
formations in numerous content domains-transformations, moreover, 
which have varying effects depending on the domain in question (a par- 
ticular transformation, e.g., may conserve weight but not length). For 
transitivity, there are no transformations, and the same abstract rules are 
directly applicable whatever the properties of the objects. Thus, how- 
ever equivalent the underlying logical systems for the two concepts may 
be, their psychological application may differ. Application of principles 
of conservation may always be more contingent on-and hence more 
susceptible to disruption by-physical knowledge and physical feedback. 
The expectat’ion from this analysis is that conservat,ion will be more 
susceptible to extinction than will transitivity. 
The second change from Miller (1973) is the addition of a delayed 
posttest. The rationale for such a test is obvious: If experimentally in- 
duced cognitive change is genuine, it should persist beyond the immediate 
testing situation. Only one extinction study (Hall & Simpson, 1968) has 
included such a follow-up. Hall and Simpson did not fully analyze the 
results of their posttest; it appears from their tabular presentation, how- 
ever, that a substantial number of original conservers did revert to con- 
servation after a two-week interval. 
The final change is an increase in the average age of the subjects. This 
increase stems from recent suggestions (e.g., Flavell, 1971) that the de- 
velopment of conservation may be a more extended process than has 
typically been thought. Perhaps feelings of logical necessity emerge only 
some time after the initial appearance of the concept. The current study 
retains two age levels as in Miller (1973) ; each group, however, is a year 
older than in the previous study. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 97 third-, fourth-, and sixth-grade children from a 
small town in southeastern Michigan. Of the 97 children, 68 were retained 
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for the complete study. These 68 children were divided equally among 
four groups: a third- and fourth-grade conservation group (mean age = 
g-6), a third- and fourth-grade transitivity group (mean age = 9-2), a 
sixth-grade conservation group (mean age = 11-g), an’d a sixth-grade 
transitivity group (mean age = 11-8). There were 9 boys and 8 girls in 
each group, with the exception of the sixth-grade conservation group, 
which contained 8 boys and 9 girls. The remaining 29 subjects were re- 
jected because of failure to pass the pretest. There were 16 failures on 
the conservation task (8 at the younger and 8 at the older age) and 13 
failures on the transitivity task (11 at the younger and 2 at the older 
age). 
Apparatus 
All testing was conducted in one room of a mobile laboratory trailer. 
The second room housed an unseen observer who recorded all relevant 
verbalizations. 
The major piece of apparatus was a hanging-pan balance scale. Out- 
comes on the scale could be read in two ways: by the alignment or non- 
alignment of the two pans, or by the movement of a pointer attached 
to the scale arm. The scale was capable of providing accurate feedback 
as to relative weight; it was also capable of providing systematically 
distorted feedback. Embedded in its base were two electromagnets, be- 
tween which hung a soft iron bar attached to the underside of the scale 
arm. Activation of either magnet attracted the bar, causing the arm to 
swing to one or the other side and creating the appearance of unequal 
weights. The magnets were activated by the depression of silent foot 
pedals concealed beneath the table. 
Procedure 
Pretest phase. The session began with some brief pretraining designed 
to assure that the subject understood how the scale operated. The pretest 
followed. Subjects were randomly assigned to either the conservation or 
the transitivity condition, within the constraint that the eventual group 
sizes be equal. 
Each pretest contained five items. In the conservation test, three of 
the items were standard conservation-of-equality problems employing 
clay balls: two balls were weighed and found equal ; one was then trans- 
formed and the conservation question asked. The transformations were 
into a pancake, a sausage, or three small balls. A fourth trial was a 
conservation-of-inequality: a ball was shown (by means of the foot 
pedal) to weigh more than a snake; the ball was then rolled into an 
identical snake and the conservation question asked. The fifth trial in- 
volved a different material: two cardboard squares were weighed and 
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found equal; one was then folded twice and the conservation question 
asked. The order of the trials was balanced, the only constraints being 
that the snake trial not appear first and that the cardboard trial always 
appear last. The general form of the conservation question was, “Does 
the red weigh more, do they still weigh the same, or does the green weigh 
more?” followed by “Why do you think so’?” 
The transitivity problems also required the subject to judge the rela- 
tive weights of t\vo objects. In this case, however, each of the objects 
was first weighed with a third, comparison object (a small piece of 
metal). The initial weighings were introduced as “a way to figure out 
what the two balls weigh.” The subject was required to verbalize the 
result’s of the two weighings, as well as to recall them immediately before 
making his judgment. If he did not recall the results correct,ly, the weigh- 
ings were repeated. The form of the transitivity question was, ‘(Does the 
red weigh more, do they weigh the same, or does the green weigh more?” 
followed by “Why do you think so?” 
On each trial, the size of the stimuli was opposed to the logical solu- 
tion of the problem. The first four trials employed small (ca. 2-in. 
diameter) and large (ca. 3+‘&in. diameter) clay balls. All of the balls 
weighed the same as the metal; apparent differences were produced by 
means of the foot pedal. The four trials (balanced for order within age 
groups) were as follows: small ball greater than metal, large ball less 
than metal; small ball greater than metal, large ball equal to metal; 
small ball equal to metal, large ball equal to metal; one small ball greater 
than metal, another small ball less than metal. The fifth trial involved 
a large and a small plastic barrel: the small barrel weighed more than 
the metal ; the large barrel weighed less. 
In both conditions, a child was retained for the complete study only 
if he answered all five problems correctly. 
Feedback phase. The feedback phase followed immediately after the 
pretest. There were three feedback trials, each identical to one of the 
first four pretest trials. The various problems from the pretest appeared 
equally often in the feedback phase, with the following exception: The 
snake trial was always one of the feedback trials for conservation, and 
the problem with two small balls was always one of the trials for transi- 
tivity (these trials permitted one case in which the outcome of the feed- 
back was that the objects weighed the same). 
Feedback was given following the subject’s judgment and explanation. 
This feedback consistently clisconfirmed either conservation or transi- 
tivity. On the conservation trials, the ball was made to appear heavier 
than the transformed object; the two snakes were made to appear equal. 
On the transitivity trials, the feedback was in the direction of the per- 
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ceptual appearance. Thus, larger balls weighed more than smaller ones; 
two equal-sized balls weighed the same. 
The experimenter waited for approximately three seconds after the 
onset of feedback, then asked “What happened?” There followed a period 
of sympathetic, flexible questioning designed to elicit the subject’s true 
feelings about the outcome. Restatements of his prediction and the actual 
outcome were frequent, as were phrases such as “What do you really 
think?” and “Is there any other reason you can think of?” This question- 
ing continued until the subject either appeared sat’isfied with an answer 
or was clearly unable to provide anything further. 
Post-feedback phase. The post-feedback phase began with an assur- 
ance that the objects would no longer be weighed after the subject’s 
judgment. The trials that followed were an attempt to depart gradually 
from the pressures of the feedback situation. Each required both a judg- 
ment and an explanation for the judgment. 
The conservation condition included six trials. The first two were 
repetitions (with different clay balls) of the two conservation-of-equality 
problems on which the subject had received feedback. The third involved 
the conservation-of-equality problem from the pretest which had not 
been included in the feedback phase. The fourth was a repetition of the 
trial with cardboard squares from the pretest. 
The final two trials were additional repetitions of the first two conser- 
vation-of-equality problems; in this case, however, the subject rather 
than the experimenter transformed the material. In addition, the final 
trial was performed without use of the scale. The subject held the two 
balls to determine their equality, transformed one, gave his conservation 
judgment and explanation, then held the stimuli again and judged their 
relative weights. Conservation was credited only if the child gave an 
equality response both before and after holding the stimuli. 
The post-feedback phase for transitivity included four trials. The 
pattern was similar to that for conservation: two problems on which the 
subject had received feedback, followed by a third problem from the 
pretest on which feedback had not been given, followed by the problem 
with different material. 
For all subjects, the session concluded with a period of questioning 
which sought to elicit the child’s true reactions to what had happened. 
The probing was similar to that on the feedback trials. Typically, it in- 
cluded verbal formulations of the problem, challenges to the child’s 
answers (e.g., “But when we started you told me that . . . .“), and re- 
quests to seek for explanations. The experimenter concluded by asking 
the child not to discuss the experiment with any of the other children. 
Delayed posttest. The subjects were brought back to the trailer ap- 
proximately one month after the first session. Not all children could be 
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retested; the final Ns were 15 for the young conservers, 14 for the old 
conservers, 16 for the young transitivity group and 14 for the old transi- 
tivity group. The setting, stimuli, and scale were identical to those of the 
first session. The experimenter was different-a second adult female, not 
seen by the child previously. 
The posttest contained six trials. The first five trials were identical to 
the pretest. The sixth trial was a repetition of the first, but with fecd- 
back provided following the subject’s judgment and explanation. The 
feedback in this case was honest-i.e., either a conservation or a transi- 
tivity outcome. The child’s prediction was elicited prior to the feedback 
and his explanation following it. The experimenter then demonstrated the 
trick and explained to the child that his initial answer had been correct. 
The child was again requested not to discuss the study with other 
children. 
Scoring 
The explanations which accompanied conservation and transitivity 
judgments were rated for logical adequacy. A conservation explanation 
was considered adequate if it fell into one of the standard Genevan 
categories (inversion, compensation, etc.). An explanation for transi- 
tivity was considered adequate if it referred accurately to both of the 
initial premises. Inter-rater reliabilities were 96% for conservation ex- 
planations and 98% for transitivity answers. 
The explanations advanced for nonconservation or nontransitivity 
(either in response to feedback or because the subject had changed his 
prediction) were categorized into types; these types are presented in 
Table 2. Inter-rater agreement was 90% for nonconservation explana- 
tions and 87% for nontransitivity explanations. In cases of disagreement, 




Three findings from the pretest should be briefly noted. First, 95% of 
the conservation answers and 95% of the transitivity answers were ac- 
companied by adequate explanations. Second, there were no significant 
differences at either age in the relative difficulty of the two tasks. Third, 
there were no sex differences on either task at either age. 
Immediate Test 
There were eight conservation trials and six transitivity trials follow- 
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judgments (i.e., either nonconservation or nontransitivity judgments) is 
indicated in Table 3. A two-way (condition by age) analysis of variance 
revealed a significant main effect of condition (F(1,64) = 48.39, p < .Ol) 
and a significant condition by age interaction (F( 1,64) = 9.51, p < .Ol) . 
The main effect of age was not significant (F(1,64) < 1). 
The source of the significant interaction is evident from the means. 
Transitivity subjects showed the expected decrease in changed judgments 
with increasing age; for conservers, however, there was a (nonsignificant) 
increase. Another way to state this finding is to note that the difference 
between conservation and transitivity, although present at both ages, 
was much greater for the older subjects. 
Figure 1 indicates the percentage of changed judgments as a function 
of trial. In general, the pattern seems similar to what would be expected 
from the nature of the trials, although the last two trials in the con- 
servation condition did prove unexpectedly difficult. Given the difficulty 
of these trials, it should be noted that all of the preceding between-group 
comparisons remain significant if only the first six conservation trials 
(those most directly comparable to the transitivity trials) are analyzed. 
An analysis of incorrect answers must be supplemented by a con- 
sideration of the explanations which accompany the answers. Of par- 
ticular interest is the proportion of wrong answers which are accompanied 
by Perceptual explanations only (this being the predominant explanation 
given by children who have not yet acquired the concept). As Table 3 
indicates, imposition of such a criterion reduces the degree of apparent 
change for all groups. Analysis of variance again revealed a significant 
effect of condition (8’(1,64) = 25.35, p < .Ol) and a significant condition 
100 r 
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by age interaction (F(1,64) = 8.60, p < .Ol) ; the effect, of age was again 
not significant (F(1,64) < 1). As was the case for changed judgments 
alone, the between-group comparisons remain significant if only the first 
six conservation trials are analyzed. They also remain significant if the 
“typical” nontransitivity explanation is broadened to include False 
Transitivity as well as Perceptual. (That the category should be ex- 
panded in this way is suggested by the fact that 26% of the incorrect pre- 
test answers were accompanied by False Transitivity explanations.) The 
broadened criterion increases the proportion of trials with changed 
answers to .31 for the younger transitivity group and .ll for the older. 
The analyses thus far have focused on the average degree of change 
shown by the various groups. It is also possible to examine individual 
patterns of response. Of the 34 conservers, all but one (a subject from 
the younger group) gave at least one nonconservation judgment on trials 
7 through 12. In contrast, 11 transitivity subjects (two younger and nine 
older) never gave a nontransitivity judgment. If the criterion of a Per- 
ceptual or False Transitivity explanation is added, the number of sub- 
jects who never change is 4 for the young conservers, 3 for the old con- 
servers, 3 for the young transitivity group, and 12 for the old transitivity 
group. 
Explanations which did not fall into the Perceptual or False Transi- 
tivity categories provide the other major basis for analysis. The relevant 
data appeared in Table 2. The proportions in the table are based on 
explanations for outcomes on the feedback trials, explanations in sup- 
port of nonconservation or nontransitivity judgments on trials 7 through 
14, and responses to the questioning at the end of the session. 
The clearest indications of resistance are provided by explanations 
from the first five categories, each of which denies that the unexpected 
outcome has really occurred. The proportion of subjects offering at least 
one such response was 47% for the young conservers, 6% for the old 
conservers, 35% for the young transitivity group, and 59% for the old 
transitivity group. The relevant between-group comparisons yielded two 
significant results: Young conservers offered more resistance responses 
than old conservers (p = .008, Fisher’s Exact Test), and the old transi- 
tivity group offered more such explanations than did old conservers 
(p = .OOl, Fisher’s Exact Test). 
In the study by Miller (1973)) the categories of High Level and Un- 
equal Weight Distribution were utilized significantly more often by old 
conservers than by young conservers. It was argued there that such 
responses reflect a “s’ophisticated” form of nonconservation: an admission 
that weight has changed, but with an explanation virtually never given 
by the typical nonconserver. The present study produced a similar de- 
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velopmental trend among the conservers; the differences, however, were 
of only borderline significance (p = .07, Fisher’s Exact Test). 
One sort of response not captured in the table is failure to pr’ovide any 
explanation at all for the unexpected outcomes on the feedback trials. It 
could be argued that such failures reflect at least a minimal form of 
resistance, given the extensive probing and the obvious perceptual differ- 
ence between the stimuli, Failures to respond were much more common 
for transitivity subjects, occurring 40 times across the three feedback 
trials, as compared to 14 instances for conservers. 
Delayed Posttest 
The proportion of posttest trials with changed answers is indicated in 
Table 3. Among transitivity subjects the posttest produced the expected 
reversion toward the earlier level of functioning. The performance of the 
older subjects, in fact, was virtually identical to their original pretest 
performance (adding False Transitivity explanations to Perceptual in- 
creases the proportion of trials with changed judgments accompanied by 
“typical” explanations to .17 and .Ol for the younger and older transi- 
tivity groups respectively). The pattern for conservers was more com- 
plicated. While the older subjects did show a moderate improvement after 
the delay, the younger subjects actually gave nlore nonconservation an- 
swers than on the immediate test. For both groups, the degree of apparent 
nonconservat’ion remained substantial. 
DISCUSSION 
The results for conservation proved quite similar to those of past re- 
search. The degree of apparent resistance was moderate; if anything, it 
was slightly lower than in Miller (1973). There was little evidence of 
increased resistance with increasing age; on the immediate test, in fact, 
the differences were in favor of the younger subjects. There was also 
little indication of a return to conservation judgments on the delayed 
posttest. 
The picture for transitivity was quite different. Transitivity subjects 
were less likely than conservers to offer changed judgments, and less 
likely to accompany changed judgments that did occur with appropriate 
explanations. Unlike conservers, transitivity subjects showed the ex- 
pected decrease in changed predictions with increasing age, as well as 
the expected improvement following the one-month delay. The degree of 
apparent extinction after one month was low at the younger age and zero 
at the older. 
Changed judgments provide one basis for inferring change; the nature 
of the subject’s explanations provides the other. The contrast between 
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conservation and transitivity subjects was less marked on the latter 
measure. A clear difference emerged at the older age in the direction of 
greater resistance by the transitivity subjects; there were no differences, 
however, at the younger age. It should be noted, of course, that such 
comparisons must be affected to some extent by the fact t’hat the con- 
servation and transitivity conditions were not equivalent in their range 
of possible explanations. In particular, the categories of Addition/Sub- 
traction, Unequal Weight Distribution, and High Level were undoubtedly 
more available for conservers, whereas those of Init,ial Weighing and (by 
definition) False Transitivity were more available for transitivity 
subjects. 
The question of the comparability of explanations raises the more 
general question of the comparability of the two extinction manipula- 
tions. Any study which compares two concepts must attempt to make its 
tests as comparable as possible; ot~herwise differences between the ron- 
cepts may simply reflect different “hit rates” of the tests (Flavell, 1971). 
The extinction procedures utilized here would appear to meet this re- 
quirement: Both involved the same materials and the same scale; both 
included three trials, presented in the same general way ; and in both 
there was a clear and consistent perceptually-based wrong answer. It 
seems quite likely, therefore, that differences in extinction really do re- 
flect the differential certainty with which the t,wo concepts are held. 
As noted, the findings for conservation confirm those of previous 
studies. They suggest that a sizable proportion of ‘conservers who have 
mastered conservation of weight by the standard measures do not ex- 
perience that concept as logically necessary. It is true, of course, that the 
possibility of misdiagnosis remains ; one direction for future research, 
therefore, would be to incorporate still further methodological controls 
for such “pseudoextinction.” Another direction would be to develop a 
variety of pretest measures in an attempt to distinguish between “con- 
servers” (by the usual criteria) who can resist extinction and those who 
cannot. Finally, the possibility of developmental changes beyond the 
grade-school age remains; there may still be a point, perhaps only in 
adulthood, when virtually all subjects would resist. The evidence for 
college-aged populations is thus far contradictory, Hall and Kingsley 
(1968) reporting little evidence of resistance, Miller, Schwartz, and 
Stewart (1973) finding very strong resistance. 
The present results give little indication that, transitivity can be ex- 
tinguished. This concept really does seem to possess the underlying neces- 
sity of which Piaget has written. As suggested earlier, the difference 
between conservation and transitivity may lie in the extent to which the 
relevant logical structures must be supplemented by “real-world” knowl- 
402 MILLER AND LIPPS 
edge concerning the properties of objects. Transitivity requires little such 
supplementation, and is correspondingly little affected when physical 
experience is put in opposition to logical structuring. Conservation re- 
quires more supplementation, and the disrupting effects of discrepant 
feedback are correspondingly greater. By this analysis, the two concepts 
may be equivalent in abstract logical structure; they differ, however, in 
the degree to which this logical structuring is expressed in psychological 
feelings of necessity. 
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